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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case Nos, 17350,
17351, 17358

-vsLARRY ELLIOTT and
\HLLIAM H. CLAYTON,
Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with Aggravated Sexual
~ssault

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

as amended) •

§

76-5-405 (1953,

They were convicted of the lesser included

offense of Forcible Sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-403 (1953, as amended),
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COflRT
Appellants, Larry Elliott and \'lilliam H, Clayton,

·. :ere found guilty of Forcible Sodomy by a jury in the Fourth

Judicial District Court, the Honorable Maurice Harding,
Judge, presiding,
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the verdicts of
guilty rendered by the jury below,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
All parties involved in this crime were inmates
at the Utah County Jail on May 4, 1980, the date of the
offense (T. 17,18),

The victim, Dennis Lynn Frazier resided

in a cell with one of the appellants, Elliott (T,18),
The other appellant, Clayton, was housed in a nearby cell
which did not lock (T.20,86,105).

The victim testified that

shortly after lock-up on May 4, 1980 appellant Elliott
grabbed him, took off his pants and drug him to the cell
bars where appellant Clayton was (T,24),

Clayton then held

the victim who was facinq inward to the cell while Elliott
told the victim to "lick my dick" and "give me a blow job"
and we will leave you alone (T,24),
and a struggle ensued.

The victim refused

The appellant Clayton took his

penis out of his pants and attempted to get the victim to
take it in his mouth (T.26),

Although the penis did not ente:

his mouth at this point there was a touching of Clayton's
penis and the victim's mouth (T.26).

The victim was

struck by Elliott and even became temporarily unconscious
as result of choking (T.33,45,92).

-2-
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The appellants stopped temporarily when they
heard a noise in the corridor,

The victim redressed and

attempted to go to bed, but this upset appellant Elliott
who grabbed the victim and wrestled him to the floor,
taking the victim's mattress with him (T.35).

Elliott

once again took the victim's pants and shorts off and
wrestled him back to the bars (T.37).

This time the

victim was held by Elliott facing Clayton who kept placing
his penis in the victim's face, at this point he made contact
with the victim's mouth (T.38,89).
A third incident followed, wherein Elliott again
forced the victim to the bars.

When the victim began to

scream for help Clayton forced an old sock in his mouth
to quiet him (T.41,52,78).

During this incideRt the

co:-i tents of a shat11?00 bottle were forced up the victim's
rectum by Clayton (T.43,48).

Clayton and Elliott then

both attempted to insert their penises into the victim's
mouth

(T.46,90).

In light of his resistence, appellant

Clayton then placed a choke hold on the victim who again
became unconscious a:-id did not reawake until the next
morning (T.45).

The victim's testimony was corroborated

by Brad Parry, an inmate in another cell at the time, who
~atched

the incident through the meal slot in his door

(T.111,118).
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The victim attempted to notify officials about
what happened by writing "Help" on his medical form but
that was not immediately noted (T,11),
The appellants in the trial court denied any intent
to do serious bodily injury to the victim (T,160,177), or
any intent to engage in sexual acts with the victim (T,158,
178,184).

Appellant Elliott objected to the failure to give

instruction on assault by a prisoner (T,237), but not to
any of the other instructions considered below,

The

instructions given by the trial court allowed the jury to
find the appellants

gui~ty

of aggravated sexual assault

or forcible sodomy or not guilty of any crime,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE AN INSTRUCTION
ON THE ONLY APPROPRIATE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FORCIBLE SODOMY,
The appellant's contention that error occurred as
a result of the trial court's failure to give an instruction
on the lesser included offinse of forcible sodomy in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
merit.

(1953, as amended)

is without

The appellants were convicted of this crime after

the judge issued instruction No. 10 which provides:
You may find either of the defendants
guilty of any offense which is necessarily

-4-
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included in the charge of aggravated sexual
assault as charged in the Information if in
your judgment, the evidence supports ~uch a
verdict under these instructions,
To enable you to apply the foregoing
instructions, you are instructed that the
offense of aggravated sexual assault, as
charged in the Information, necessarily
includes the crime of "forcible sodomy,"
which is a lesser offense, the elements of
which are stated in paragraphs Numbered "l"
and "2" of Instruction No, 7.
If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendants are guilty of an offense
included within the charge in the Information,
but entertain a reasonable doubt as to the
crime of which they are guilty, it is your
duty to convict them only of the lesser offense,
(R,

49).

The elements of forcible sodomy as listed in instruction
No. 7 provide:
1.
That on or about the 4th day of May,
1980, at Utah County, Utah, the defendants,
\iilliam Clayton and Larry Elliott, did engaqe
~n a sexual act involving the genitals of
defendants and the mouth of Dennis Frazier,
2,
That such sexual act was corrunitted
without consent of Dennis Frazier.
~hese

elements are consistent with § 76-5-403 Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended) which provides:
(1)
A person corrunits sodomy when he engages
in any sexual act involving the genitals of one
oerson and the mouth or anus of another person,
~eoardless of the sex of either participant.
(2)
A person corrunits forcible sodomy when
he corrunits sodomy upon another without the other's
consent.
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Thus the appellants contention of error is without merit,
since the trial court adequately instructed the jury on
the lesser included offense of forcible sodomy
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-403

(1953, as amended),
POINT II

INSTRUCTIONS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL, ARE NOT REVIEWABLE UNLESS A
FAILURE TO GIVE THEM SUA SPONTE, RESULTED
IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; NO SUCH INJUSTICE
HAS BEEN SHOWN,
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise that
a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to present
his theory of the case to the jury.
Hendricks, 596 P,2d 633

However, in State v.

(Utah 1979) this Court recognized

that "the right is not absolute, and a defense theory must
be supported by a certain quantum of evidence before an
instruction as to an included offense need be given."

See

also, State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972);
State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971);
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738

(1947).

the right is not unlimited, the trial court is not

Because

necessari~

bound to give all instructions relating to defense theories
simply because they are requested or characterized by the
defendant as reflecting his theory of the case.

This is

especially true where the defendant does not request an

-6-
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instruction,

In such a case, the decision to give an

instruction is totally within the discretion of the trial
court,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

§

77-35-19(c)

provides:
No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless
he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter
to which he objects and the ground of his
objection, Notwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned
to instructions in order to avoid manifest
injustice.
As here demonstrated, the general rule is that error will
not be assigned to instructions given to the jury unless
objections to those instructions or omissions are made in
the trial court.

Even though a party may raise error on

appeal based on something not objected to below this should
::ml~·
~he

be a110-..1ed v.-:-iere manifest injustice would result if

claim of error

~as

not allowed.

The statute is based upon sound policy considerations.
~ttorneys QUS~
poten~ial
~ime.

be

errors

re~uired
w~ich

to call a court's attention to

could be avoided or corrected at the

Otherwise an attorney could invite error or inten-

~ionally

fail to call a courts attention to correctable

reversible error, thus ensuring two chances to win his case if
'.1e or she loses at t'.!e trial.

With the invited error, he or she
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can appeal and obtain a second trial, where one trial
would have sufficed.

Thus the system could be bogged

down in costly, unnecessary appeals and new trials.
See Simpson v. General Motors Corp., infra at 9,
In the present case the trial court correctly
issued instructions to the jury which gave them three
alternatives.

The jury could find the defendants guilty

of aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code
Ann,§ 76-5-405(l)(a)(ii)

(1953, as amended), or guilty

of forcible sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 765-403 (1953, as amended) or they could have found them
not guilty of any crime if the evidence was insufficient
to support guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt,
The evidence was either sufficient to establish their
guilt on the crimes instructed or insufficisnt to find
them guilty at all.

The instructions which the appellants

now, for the first time on appeal, claimed are applicable,
are discussed in Points III and IV, infra.
There has been no showing of manifest injustice
to the appellants by the trial court's not giving the
instructions which they now claim are applicable,

Absent

such a demonstration, this Court should not review the
instructions raised by the appellants for the first time
on appeal.

-8-
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The appellants, after failing in the requests
they did make below, now attempt, for the first time on
appeal, to raise other allegedly applicable instructions,
In Simpson v. General ~otors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301,
470 P.2d 399

(1970)

this Court said:

Orderly procedure, whose proper
purpose is the final settlement of
controversies, requires that a party
must present his entire case and his
theory or theories of recovery to the
trial court; and having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some
different theory and thus attempt to
keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.
470 P.2d at 401.

See also:

State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d

160, 499 P,2d 846 (1972); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah
2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965).
~he

on the
1..'as

trial court was given no opportunity to rule

appiicabil~ty

of the requested instructions.

There

no request fo::- many of the instructions now raised on

appeal and in the absence of a showing of manifest injustice
~o

the ap?ellants,

by this

t~e

instructio~s

should not be reviewed

Cour~.

-9-
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POINT III
INSTRUCTIONS, RAISED NOW FOR THE FIRST
TIME, ON APPEAL, AND THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER
ARE NOT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT,
In addition to an instruction on forcible sodomy
discussed in Point I, supra, the appellants contend that
the trial court erred in not giving instruction on:
1)

assault by a prisoner in violation of § 76-5-102,5

Utah Code Ann,

(1953, as amended); 2)

aggravated assault

by a prisoner in violation of § 76-5-103.5 Utah Code Ann,
(1953, as amended); 3)

attempted forcible sodomy in

violation of§ 76-4-101 Utah Code Ann,
and 4)

(1953, as amended);

forcible sexual abuse in violation of § 76-5-404(1)

Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended).

Further they state

that this error should be the basis of reversal regardless
of the fact that there was only an objection to the failure
to give the assault by a prisoner instruction by only one
of the appellants--appellant Elliott.

As noted above, all

the other instructions are not properly before this Court.
However, if this Court should decide to review
the appellants' requested instructions it will find that
these instructions are not lesser included offenses and
thus need not have been given.

-10-
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The standard through which an offense is determined to be lesser and included in another offense is well
established.
Under l'tah Code Ann.

§

76-1-402(3) (a)

(1953, as

amended), a defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged when:
(a)
It is established by proof
of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission
of the offense charged , , ,
This statute codifies the so-called "same evidence" test
for an included offense as defined in previous case law,
See State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 198, 371 P,2d 27 (1962);
State v. Sunter, 550 P.2d 184 (Utah 1976); and State v, Woolman,
84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 645 (1934),
In State v. Brennan, supra, the Court elaborated
on the

def~nitio~

of a lesser included offense and stated:

The rule as to when one offense is
included in another is that the
areater of:ense includes a lesser
one w~en establishment of the greater
wou:d ~ecessarily include proof of
all t~e elements necessary to prove
the lesser.
Conversely, it is only
when ~te proof of the lesser offense
requires some element not involved
in the areater offense that the lesser
wou:d ~;~ be an included offense,
13 l'tah 2d at 197, 371 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
Thus, in

accorda~ce

with both the statutory and judicial

-11-
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definitions of a lesser included offense, it is necessary
to look to the legal elements of the crimes to see if
the "alleged" lesser included offenses only contain elements
which are not part of the qreater offense.
The instructions profferred by the appellants,
for the first time on appeal, are not within this standard
and thus are not lesser included offenses of aggravated
sexual assault.

Appellant Elliott, in the court below, objected
to the court's denial of his request for a "lesser included
offense" instruction on assault by a prisoner (T,237),
Appellant's requested instruction provided:
If you do not find the defendants guilty
of aggrevated [sic] sexual assault, you may
find the defendants guilty of the lesser
included offense of assault by a prisoner.
76-5-102.5 Assault by prisoner.-Any
prisoner who commits assault, intending to
cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony
of the third degree.
76-5-102. Assault-(1) Assault is:
(a)
PJ1 attempt, with unlawful force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
or
(b)
A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another,
"Prisoner" defined.-For
76-5-101.
purpose of this part "prisoner" means any
person who is in custody of a peace officer
pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined
in a jail or other penial [sic] institution
regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
(R. 45),

-12-
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The trial court's refusal to give the appellants'
proffered instruction was totally correct,
Under

§

76-5-405 Utah Code Ann,

(1953, as amended)

aggravated sexual assault is defined as:
(1)
A person commits aggravated sexual
assault if:
(a)
In the course of a rape or attempted
rape or forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy:
(i)
The actor causes serious bodily injury
to the victim; or
(ii)
The actor compels submission to the
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of
kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury
to be inflicted imminently on any person,
The crime of assault by a prisoner is defined in § 76-5102.5 as follows:
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending
to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a
felony of the third degree,
The elements of the alleged lesser offense include an
element which is not necessary to the proof of the alleged
greater offense of aggravated sexual assault.

In order to

establish assault by a prisoner there must be proof that
the defendant was in fact a prisoner when the act occurred,
On the other hand, the crime of aggravated sexual assault
does not require proof of this element.

An individual may

be convicted of aggravated sexual assault regardless of
whether or not he is a prisoner, thus "proof of the lesser
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offense requires some element not involved in the greater
offense" State v. Brennan, supra, which means that the
alleged lesser offense is not a lesser included offense
of aggravated sexual assault,
Similar to assault by a prisoner, irrunediately
preceeding, the aggravated assault by a prisoner statute
contains an element which is not present in the aggravated
sexual assault statute.

Namely that the actor was a prisoner

when the assault occurred,

Since this is not an element

of the "greater offense," the aggravated sexual assault
statute does not come within the lesser included offense
standard of State v,

Brennan,,~,

and it is clear that

aggravated assault by a prisoner is not a lesser included
offense of aggravated sexual assault.
Also, aggravated assault by a prisoner cannot
be a "lesser" included offense because it carries the
same penalty as the crime with which the appellants were
charged.

Both crimes are second degree felonies.
Forcible sexual abuse also contains elements

necessary to conviction which are not present in the aggravated sexual assault offense, thus forcible sexual abuse
is not a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault.

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The forcible sexual abuse statute § 76-5-404 provides:
~(l)
A person commits forcible sexual
abuse if, under circumstances not amounting
to rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or
sodomy, he touches the anus or any part of
the genitals of another, or otherwise takes
indecent liberties with another, or causes
another to take indecent liberties with
himself or another, with intent to cause
substantial emotional or bodily pain to any
person or with the intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person,
without the consent of the other,

(2)
Forcible sexual abuse is a felony
of the third degree,
The forcible sexual assault statute is aimed at
punishing the taking of indecent liberties with the intent
to cause emotional or bodily pain or the intent to arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
element is not the same as the intent element
aggravated sexua::. assault

s~atute

This intent
~ound

in the

and thus forcible sexual

abuse "requires sor:Le elemer.t not involved in the greater
offense" of aggravated sexual assault,
accordance with State v, Brennan,
abuse is not a

lesse~

i~c!~ded

~,

Therefore, in
forcible sexual

cffense of aggravated sexual

3...SSS.Ul t.

"Attempts" to commit a crime are statutorily
declared includeC. offenses in § 76-1-402 (3) (b) Utah Code
Ann.

- d) .
(1953, as ar..e:-ice

~hus at~empted

forcible sodomy,

is an included offer.se of forcible sodomy which is a lesser
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included offense of aggravated sexual assault, the original
charge against the appellants,

However, the circumstances

of this case made the giving an instruction on attempted
forcible sodomy inappropriate,

(See Point IV below).

POINT IV
ASSUMING, THAT INSTRUCTIONS NOW RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, COULD BE CONSIDERED
INCLUDED OFFENSES, THEY WERE INCONSISTENT WITH
APPELLANTS' EVIDENCE AND THEORY OF THE CASE,
AND NOT JUSTIFIED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Even if, arguendo, all of the instructions raised
by the appellants' on appeal, are somehow considered lesser
included offenses, the requested instructions would still be
inappropriate,

Included offense instructions need not be given

unless there is evidence to acquit the defendant of the higher
crime and convict him of the lesser, putative crime.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-33-6 reads:
The jury may find the defendant
guilty of any offense the commission of
which is necessarily included in that
with which he is charged in the indictment or information, or of an attempt
to commit the offense,
In State v, Bender, 581 P,2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 19781
this Court stated that the above section is governed by Utah
Code Annotated § 76-1-402 (4)

(1953, as amended), under which:

The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an
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included offense unless there is
a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense,
(Emphasis added,)
?he Court also noted that this statute is a codification of
case law which extends back to 1889,
6 Utah 101, 21 P. 403

People v. Robinson,

(1889),

In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976),
the defendant was convicted of the crime of unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance.

He appealed,

alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to give an
instruction on the lesser included offense of possession
of a controlled substance.

In affirming the conviction,

this Honorable Court held that where defense testimony
could prove only complete innocence, the defendant was not
en~~tled

to an

ins~ruction

on the lesser included offense.

?his Court citing Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d
592 (1966), enunciated the three situations in which the
~uestion

o~ whe~he~

~o

instruct on lesser included offenses

are frequently encountered:
. . ?irst, where there is evidence
1·.'hich 1·:ould absolve the defendant from
guilt of a greater offense, or degree,
but would support a finding of guilt of
a-lesser offense, or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
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Second, where the evidence would not
support a finding of guilt in the commission
of the lesser offense or degree,
For
example, the defendant denies any complicity
in the crime charged, and thus lays no
foundation for any intermediate verdict, or
where the elements of the offense differ,~
and some element essential to the lesser
offense is either not proved or shown not
to exist.
This second situation renders an
instruction on a lesser included offense
erroneous, because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation,
One where the elements of the greater
offense include all the elements of the
lesser offense; because, by its very nature,
the greater offense could not have been
committed without defendant having the
intent in doing the acts, which constitute
the lesser offense,
In such a situation
instructions on the lesser included offense
may be given because all elements of the
lesser offense have been proved,
However, such an instruction may properly
be refused if the prosecution has met its
burden of proof of the greater offense,
and there is no evidence tending to reduce
the greater offense. 550 P,2d at 176, 177.
(Emphasis added.)
This was affirmed in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah
1977); State v. Bell, 563 P,2d 186 (Utah 1977).

Thus an

instruction is not properly given if there is no evidence
to support a conviction on the lesser offense and acquit
the appellant of the greater offense.
Furthermore, if a defendant's theory of the case is
all theory and no evidence, or based on the evidence, so
unreasonable that it does not satisfy the requirements of a
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defense, no instruction thereon is required,
Code Ann.

§

76-2-201, et seq,

See Utah

(1953, as amended),

The appellant correctly states that in order to
have instructions on lesser included offenses given there
nust be a basis for acquitting the defendant of the greater
crime and convictina him of the lesser,
In the present case, the evidence presented by
the appellants falls under the second situation cited in
State v. Dougherty, supra, at 18, in which an instruction
on a lesser included offense is not appropriate at all.
The appellants denied any complicity in the crime, stating
that they had no intent to cause the victim any bodily
injury (T,160,177) or to engage in any sexual acts (T.158,
178,184).
~nclined

If this

~ere

in fact the case, and the jury was

to believe appellants' versions of the story, then

no conviction could stand either for the greater offense
of aggravated sexual assault or for the "alleged" lesser
of~ense

of assault ty a prisoner, since there would be no

:ricinal intent.

a~

the other hand, if the jury believed,

as they apparently did, that the appellants forcibly
sodomized the victim, then there would only be grounds for
con\·iction of forcible sodomy without a basis to convict on
~he

lesser offense of assault by a prisoner.
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This case falls directly under the guidelines of
State v. Douqherty, supra, where the Court declared, "The
defense testimony could only prove complete innocence,"
There, as here, the appellant tried to proceed on a lesser
included offense theory, but this was rejected by the
Court:
. Such a theory is not available
to him where the record shows he could
only be found guilty or not guilty of the
crime charged.
550 P,2d at 177,
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah Code Ann,
§

76-1-402 (4)

(1953, as amended), the trial court in the case

at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an included offense,
because even though the jury may have chosen to believe the
appellant, thereby acquitting him, no evidentiary basis
existed upon which a conviction of assault by a prisoner couN
stand.

Since Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)

is stated in the

cor.junctive, both statutory requisites must be present before
the trial court would be required to instruct on the

includ~

of:'ense.
Thus the trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct on assault by a prisoner, even if assault by a
prisoner could somehow be considered a lesser included
of:'ense of aggravated sexual assault.
Similarly, the evidence below did not justify an
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instruction on aggravated assault by a prisoner,
no~ed

As

above, the appellants' theory of the case in the

trial court was that they were teasing the victim and
did not possess any intent to cause serious bodily injury
':o the 'Tictirn nor any intent to sodomize the victim,
hccording to the appellants, they were merely teasing
the victim in an attempt to get him to tell them about the
"rape" he was charged with (T,158,176),

If this theory

were believed by the jury, the appellants could not have
been convicted of any crime for which they now request
instructions, not aggravated sexual assault, nor forcible
sodomy, nor aggravated assault by a prisoner,
Thus, "the defense testimony could only prove
co;::iplete innocence,"

State v, Dougherty,

~·

There,

as tere, an ins~ruction on the "alleged" lesser offense
instruc':ion need not be given by the trial court,
~he

evidence and the appellants' theory of the

case di~ not justi=y an instruction on attempted forcible
The at':em?t statute
'1953, as amended)

§

76-4-101 Utah Code Ann,

provides:

(1)
For purposes of this part a person is
ouilt? o= an attempt to commit a crime if
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial s":ep tov:ard commission of the offense.
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(2)
For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's intent to corrunit the offense,
(Emphasis added,)
The appellants' theory in the court below was that
they possessed no intent to either, cause serious bodily
injury or engage in sodomy with the victim.

If the jury

chose to believe this theory there would not be a basis for
a conviction of any crime.

Not forcible sodomy or aggravated

sexual assault nor attempted forcible sodomy.

Therefore,

as in State v. Dougherty, supra, an instruction may properly
be refused if there is no evidence to both convict on the
lesser offense and acquit of the greater offense.

As in

Dougherty if the jury believed the appellants theory of the
case it would only prove complete innocence, thus the appellar1:
were not entitled to such an instruction.
Assuming, arguendo, that forcible sexual abuse
were a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault,
neithe~

the facts of this case nor the theory presented by

the appellants justify such an instruction.

The appellants

denied intent to engage in any sexual acts with the victim
(T.158,178,184), thus there is no basis upon which the
jury could find intent to arouse the sexual desire of any
person.

The appellants also denied any intent to cause
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pain to the victim {T,160,177) thus, no intent to cause
substantial emotional or bodily pain could possibly be
found by a jury if they believed the appellants,

Although

the appellants acknowledged some unlawful touching of the
victim they denied any contact with his genitals or anus,
Once again the appellants' theory and testimony could only
prove complete innocence, thus the appellants are not
entitled to an instruction on an "alleged" lesser included
offense,

Therefore, the trial court did not err in not,

sua sponte, giving an instruction on forcible sexual abuse,

CONCLUSION
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure § 77-35-19(c)
?ro~ide

that a ?arty may not assign error on appeal to

-:he c::-:arcing or
~here

cm~ssion

of instructions by the trial court

no objecticn was made in the trial court.

excep~io~ ~o this rule
res~l~

i~ nanifest

The

is where failure to do so will

injustice to the parties.

In this case

-:he a?pe:lants d'~ not demonstrate that manifest injustice
-.,o-~ld occur to tten, therefore no error should be assigned
~rorn ~nstructions no~ raised by appellants for the first

-:ime on c.p;ieal.
~urthermore, even if this Court should examine
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the instructions raised by the appellants there is no
basis upon which reversible error may be found,

The trial

court instructed on the lesser offense of forcible sodomy,
and appellants were convicted thereof.

The other

instructions raised now by appellants are not lesser
included offenses of aggravated sexual assault.

Finally,

assuming, arguendo, that the unrequested instructions
could somehow be considered lesser included offenses, the
trial court was not obligated to qive the instructions
because there was no rational basis upon which the
appellants could be "acquitted of the greater offense and
convicted of the lesser offense" State v. Brennan, supra.
Therefore the instructions as given by the trial court
were proper and the appellants' convictions of forcible
sodomy should stand.
Respectfully submitted,
DJl_VID L, l'JILKINSON

Attorney General
ROBERT R. \•JALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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